Where did we get those old law books? It's quite a story. It starts when Washington was president ...

These law books have been handed down from lawyer to lawyer, including:

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Richard Henry Lee,
1732-1794. Justice of the Peace, Delegate to the Virginia House of Burgesses and the Continental Congress, signer and leading proponent of the Declaration of Independence, President of the Continental Congress 1784-85. But most importantly, he did more than anyone to ensure that a Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution. He bought and inscribed some of these books for his son, Francis Lightfoot Lee II, 1782-1850.

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John Janney,
1798-1872, was a Quaker, Unionist lawyer in Leesburg, Virginia. Among his many great works was the successful defense of free-born Underground Railroad conductor Leonard Grimes of Leesburg. He was almost President: in a pivotal Virginia Whig caucus, he tied with John Tyler on the first ballot for the 1840 vice-presidential nomination. Henry Clay said, “He is the first man in Virginia and has no superior in the United States.” He was a delegate to the 1851 Virginia Constitutional Convention, which tried to heal the breach between eastern and western Virginia, and President of the 1861 convention that he hoped would preserve the Union. It swung in favor of secession when Lincoln called for troops to march against the South. He then had the bitter honor of formally giving Robert E. Lee charge of Virginia’s forces.

“Squire” Lawrence Bowers, 1810-1901, was called that because he was a local magistrate in Boone’s Creek, Washington County, Tennessee. He helped found the Boone’s Creek Academy. Ralph Waldo Crouch, Sr. was his grandson.

 Matthew Harrison, 1822-1875, was a Leesburg lawyer, known in the legislature as “The Loudoun Lion”.

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The Rev. Alexander Broadnax Carrington,
1834-1912, from Charlotte Court House, Va., studied at Washington College and practiced law, but then chose the Presbyterian ministry. He was chaplain of the 37th Virginia Infantry under Stonewall Jackson. His final pastorate was at Greenwich Presbyterian Church in Nokesville, Va.

Landon C. Berkeley and James P. Harrison of Berkeley & Harrison were prominent Danville, Va. lawyers in the late 19th Century.

E.S. Oliver, owner of our French Code Napoleon, was a New Orleans lawyer and businessman in the mid-19th Century. He won Lavillebeuvre v. Cosgrove, about the right to reopen a boarded-up window through a common wall between two properties, under the French version of easement law, called “destination du père de famille.” He lost a case against his agent for letting a debtor pay him in Confederate money and investing it in Confederate bonds, because he didn’t complain when he heard about it, thinking he could “sit on his rights.”

Samuel Ferguson Beach, a Connecticut-born Alexandria lawyer, city councilman, and banker, lost a Northern Virginia congressional race in early 1861, then filed a challenge to election practices at Ball’s Crossroads, now Ballston. He was a leading member of the Constitutional Convention for the "Restored Government of Virginia," and unionist Northern Virginians elected him to Congress, which refused to seat him. He represented the Lee family of Arlington House, and other former Confederates, in Virginia and U.S. Supreme Court cases overturning the wartime seizure of their land. He won Colston v. Quander, upholding a Fairfax marriage that was illegal when made because it was between a slave and a free Negro. In other cases he argued for upholding a law preventing free blacks from testifying against whites, and that Congress’s return of Alexandria and present-day Arlington to Virginia was unconstitutional. He helped lead efforts to give black Virginians voting rights, and was appointed United States Attorney for Virginia. He was once co-counsel with future President James A. Garfield.

Samuel McCormick, 1849-1937, son of Justice Francis McCormick of Weehaw, briefly served in the Confederate Army, then studied law at the University of Virginia, where he owned these books, and then at Washington College, now Washington & Lee University. He was an honorary pallbearer for Robert E. Lee. He was a lawyer, farmer and businessman in Clarke County, Virginia, and was Court Clerk there from 1904 to 1912. 

Joseph J. Darlington, 1849-1920, was a leading Washington lawyer, citizen, prize pig breeder, and president of the City Orphan Asylum. He taught law at Georgetown University, and gave Ralph Waldo Crouch, Sr. a copy of his treatise on The Law of Personal Property. They were neighbors in Herndon and commuted together on the W&O.D. Railroad. A memorial to him at Judiciary Square has been criticized for its utter lack of resemblance to him. 20130705_150437

Ralph Waldo Crouch, Sr., 1881-1968, was youngest of ten children of a Baptist preacher, and his inheritance was one horse, which he sold to buy a ticket to Washington to seek his fortune. He did a variety of jobs, including streetcar conductor, and went to school at night while raising a growing family. He graduated from Georgetown Law in 1912, and was a tax lawyer and estate-tax auditor for the U.S. Government, commuting by train from his in-laws’ farm in Herndon. He later joined Crouch & Crouch, practicing in Arlington and Richmond. In retirement he moved back to the farm his great-grandparents had settled in the late 1700s in Boone’s Creek, Tennessee.

George Edelin, 1891-1938, Georgetown Law 1918, joined Julius Peyser’s general and administrative-law practice in Washington, D.C., where his early work included U.S. Supreme Court cases. He was a law professor at the University of Maryland.

George J. Schultz, 1885-1961, earned doctorates in law, medicine and divinity, and was a law professor at the University of Maryland. He married George Edelin’s brother’s widow. After his death his law books were entrusted to her goats, in his barn in Hyattstown, Maryland, until Richard Edelin Crouch retrieved a few of them.

John Walter Edelin, Jr., 1905-1980. His naval career started on President Coolidge’s yacht, where he assisted the President in an unannounced amphibious landing at George Washington’s birthplace, to fierce combat in the Battle of Peleliu, to the military governorship of the Palau Islands.

John W. Jackson, 1905-2006, was a legendary Arlington prosecutor and lawyer. He taught trial skills at the George Washington University Law School. In semi-retirement he was still an eminence and mentor to everyone in the office suite of John Perkins, where Richard Crouch had his first full-time law office after leaving Family Law Reporter.

Howard Wade Vesey, 1906-1969, was a Washington lawyer who later moved to Santa Barbara, California where he was also a real estate developer. He died in a plane crash and his wrongful death case ascended as high as the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Thomas Gordon Crouch, 1910-2004. His practice with Crouch & Crouch in Arlington and Richmond emphasized tax, business, probate and estate planning law. A dedicated hunter, fisherman, sailor and Shriner. He led the funding and organization of the restoration of his great-great grandfather Jesse Crouch’s log house.

Leroy E. Batchelor, 1926-2012, served in World War II, including the Battle of Iwo Jima, and the Korean War. He was a criminal defense and general practitioner in Arlington. He represented Arlington County in a school desegregation case. He once argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. An accomplished seaman and boating instructor, he retired at 62. He and his wife spent much of the next two decades at sea.

Jack L. Melnick, 1935-2013, was an Arlington/Falls Church legislator, prosecutor, civic leader and lawyer. In the legislature, he led the effort for a crime victims’ compensation fund. He taught at George Washington University Law School. He restored and drove a Model A Ford. His probate and elder law practice continues with his son, Paul Melnick.

The Hon. W. Richard Walton, Sr., b. 1938, is a civic leader, former prosecutor and retired Common Pleas Court Judge in Ironton, Ohio.

Thomas W. Murtaugh had a general, criminal, juvenile and family-law practice in Leesburg, Virginia. He represented people from all walks of life and excelled at presenting the human reality of his cases in everyday terms. He was gentlemanly and kindly to a fault. Richard and John Crouch learned much from him. He gave us John Janney’s books when he moved to West Virginia, where he practiced occasionally but is now fully retired.

Bill Findler 1948-2007 was widely admired as an Arlington lawyer, but even more as a Washington-Lee high school track coach, pillar of the church, and father of five. When he died suddenly after a morning run, his obituary on the sports page of the Northern Virginia Sun quoted John Crouch: “He was a leader for all of us. He was strong and honest. He told it like it is. He dealt with every situation with humor and integrity.”

Bryan Garner is a leading authority on legal writing and drafting. He redrafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and several similar sets of rules, edits Black’s Law Dictionary, and wrote several books on legal writing, including two coauthored with Justice Scalia. It’s a stretch to include him here, because I don’t have a book from his personal collection; he gave me a copy of his Black’s as a sort of party-favor for answering a question right in a seminar. As I look up to him as a life-changing guru and kindred spirit, I cling to it like Dobby the House Elf clung to his employer’s discarded glove.

Richard Edelin Crouch, b. 1940, is a prolific lawyer, author, and activist.  He had a military, criminal, civil liberties, public interest and general practice before limiting his practice to family law and legal ethics and malpractice, and especially international and interstate family law. At the same time he edited BNA’s Family Law Reporter and other publications, then the Virginia State Bar’s Family Law News, and several family law books and practice guides. He is now retired.


Kentucky enacts 50-50 custody presumption

"There shall be a presumption, rebuttable by a preponderance of evidence, that joint custody and equally shared parenting time is in the best interest of the child. If a deviation from equal parenting time is warranted, the court shall construct a parenting time schedule which maximizes the time each parent or de facto custodian has with the child and is consistent with ensuring the child's welfare." ...

"When determining or modifying a custody order pursuant to Section 1, 2, or 4 of this Act, the court shall consider the safety and well-being of the parties and of the children. If domestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720 is alleged, and the court finds that it has been committed by one (1) of the parties against another party or a child of the parties within three (3) years immediately preceding the custody hearing in question, the court shall not presume that joint custody and equally shared parenting time is in the best interest of the child."

HB 528, recently signed by Kentucky's governor. There are other provisions, but those are the wholly new and most important ones.

Full text of bill and amendments

h/t Larry Gaughan, Creative Divorce Network


Shocked by cheerfully ignorant, arrogant decision-making? Not if you've seen a judge learn family law on the job.

There was a lot of interest on social media in 's analysis of how President Trump deals quickly and authoritatively with issues he admittedly knows nothing about.  was thunderstruck at how monstrously dangerous it was to have major decisions made in cheerfully-admitted ignorance, by what the decision-maker thinks is simple common sense. But as a family law attorney, I really couldn't tell any difference between the President's performance and watching a judge who's new to Family Law, trying to puzzle out why the law seems to want both parents involved in a child's life after a breakup, why unwed fathers have the few rights they do have, etc. Or what the Hague Convention on child abduction is for, and what in the world is wrong with a mom taking her children halfway around the world just to get them far away from the father. Or the times I've watched Supreme Court Justices do the same thing as they debate the Hague Convention, or paternity law, assume the validity of wildly wrong speculations about what happens in custody litigation, and snort with equal contempt at the parents in these cases and the Congress that passed such seemingly pointless laws and treaties. Even experienced trial judges sometimes just reinforce their bias and irrational rules-of-thumb over time. 

Here's the Trump version of this routine:

SHERIFF AUBREY: And the other thing is asset forfeiture. People want to say we’re taking money and without due process. That’s not true. We take money from dope dealers —

THE PRESIDENT: So you’re saying – okay, so you’re saying the asset-taking you used to do, and it had an impact, right? And you’re not allowed to do it now?

SHERIFF AUBREY: No, they have curtailed it a little bit. And I’m sure the folks are —

THE PRESIDENT: And that’s for legal reasons? Or just political reasons?

SHERIFF AUBREY: They make it political and they make it – they make up stories. All you’ve got to do —

THE PRESIDENT: I’d like to look into that, okay? There’s no reason for that. Dana, do you think there’s any reason for that? Are you aware of this?

[Then-acting Attorney General Dana Boente]: I am aware of that, Mr. President. And we have gotten a great deal of criticism for the asset forfeiture, which, as the sheriff said, frequently was taking narcotics proceeds and other proceeds of crime. But there has been a lot of pressure on the department to curtail some of that.

THE PRESIDENT: So what do you do? So in other words, they have a huge stash of drugs. So in the old days, you take it. Now we’re criticized if we take it. So who gets it? What happens to it? Tell them to keep it?

MR. BOENTE: Well, we have what is called equitable sharing, where we usually share it with the local police departments for whatever portion that they worked on the case. And it was a very successful program, very popular with the law enforcement community.

THE PRESIDENT: And now what happens?

MR. BOENTE: Well, now we’ve just been given – there’s been a lot of pressure not to forfeit, in some cases.

THE PRESIDENT: Who would want that pressure, other than, like, bad people, right? But who would want that pressure? You would think they’d want this stuff taken away.

SHERIFF AUBREY: You have to be careful how you speak, I guess. But a lot of pressure is coming out of – was coming out of Congress. I don’t know that that will continue now or not.

THE PRESIDENT: I think less so. I think Congress is going to get beat up really badly by the voters because they’ve let this happen. And I think badly. I think you’ll be back in shape. So, asset forfeiture, we’re going to go back on, okay? I mean, how simple can anything be? You all agree with that, I assume, right?

Watching Donald Trump Try to Puzzle Out What ‘Asset Forfeiture’ Means Is Deeply Discomfiting

By  in New York Magazine

See also, for example,


Tainted Love? Let Us Count the Cost. Forbes Magazine Audits Adultery's Accounts.

"How Much Does Infidelity Cost?", Forbes.com asks. I'm just glad someone is asking the question, and acknowledging that such choices, and divorce, have costs and are not "value-neutral."

The article starts with costs so trivial as to be ridiculous, but then follows out some very foreseeable and common consequences -- separate vacations, faraway hideaways, therapy, marriage counseling, separation, restraining orders among new partners and old, loss of security clearances and arms-bearing rights for people under restraining orders, divorce, increased divorce-lawyer costs as the adultery makes every issue in the divorce more vicious and hard-fought, job loss for workplace affairs, a few months of unemployment, and finally a new job that pays 20% less. 

The writing tone is a little bit like a typical canned article, what Helen Fielding's Bridget Jones called "a two-shrink, five-friend" article, except that the subject is so rarely brought up in the media, though it has always been a huge topic in life, art and literature. There's a bit of copy-editing, or lack thereof, that's really surprising in a top-flight source like Forbes. A couple times I thought I was reading one of those odd articles that are taken from real ones, then run through a couple translators and/or some guys in India who didn't qualify for jobs with the gang that calls people up pretending to be "Windows." That's happened to many of my own articles. It ends oddly, like a freshman term paper ending at the exact turn-in deadline with a neat balancing of supposed opposites that actually makes no sense, resting on assumptions and definitions that reveal the author to know far less of the basic terms and context than it appeared from the introduction as it rose slowly through 50 shades of obvious, or from the body of the paper as the student could lean this way and that on quotations and cautiously slight paraphrases of opposing authorities on the topic. Anyhow, back to the Forbes article.  No, wait, this lamest conclusion that I've seen, except in term papers that potential interns send me as writing samples, goes on for two paragraphs of appalling shallowness, totally betraying the whole point of the article by nattering about these things as if they were subjects one would encounter for the first and last time in a college class, and never in real life:

"Who are the people engaging in these covert relationships? Nika Kabiri, Director of Strategic Insights for Avvo, the company which offers a fixed fee uncontested divorce, recently conducted a relationship study to uncover this answer.

Avvo is where you go for reliable studies of marriage? I mean, they're a great company for what they do, and I'm sure Kabiri and his team are good at studying their potential customers, but there are actual disinterested scholars, statisticians and therapists who study these things, many of whom are studying how to keep more marriages healthy and together, not to grow the number of people who get ensnarled in family/legal problems.

"Kabiri found that 61% of Americans are unhappily married.

[I've never seen a figure over the high 40s.] 

"Yet only ¼ of these people say that divorce is inevitable if one no longer wants a romantic relationship with his/her spouse. In fact, nearly 80% believe in staying together so much so that they are open to exploring alternatives to breaking up. Only half of these people say that if their partner wanted an open relationship they would leave him or her. [What about those who respond with, "Oh No, you won't,", among many others?]  In other words half who are confronted with a partner who wants to stray are willing to talk about it, work through it, maybe even be part of an open relationship. 

[Uh, you're not curious about defining who wants to fix the marriage versus who wants an 'open relationship'?]

"While on the surface it seems that having an affair is financially a more affordable road than divorc'em this is not necessarily the case. Clearly the emotional, mental and financial hardship could end up being more detrimental than enduring a divorce."

Huh? Despite everything in the first half of the article, now  "Having an Affair"and "Divorce'Em" are not cause-and-effect, but the two mutually exclusive alternatives for a Smart Shopper to thoughtfully consider? All that talk about how a marriage that grows unhappy doesn't have to devolve into divorce, and in fact 80% of them recover, and suddenly the only alternatives to divorce are affairs and "open relationships"? Sick.

"How Much Does Infidelity Cost? The Real Dollars & Cents", by Kerri Zane ,on Forbes.com


US divorce rates up slightly; latest state, international, military & age-based rates


Think family court is a big racket? You're not alone ... until you get to court. Then you truly are.

One of those crank lawsuits of a kind that gets filed and discarded every day has, for once, gotten big coverage in a mainstream newspaper. "Lawsuit claims divorce court is a racket: Dismissed at district level, case is being appealed to 9th Circuit". San Diego Union-Tribune

If you polled people on the street, you'd find that to be a pretty common view, perhaps not a majority but a plurality of the same kind that makes the presidential primaries so interesting. But in the family court system, people who have cases there, and start saying things like that, are treated like the lunatic fringe. To the judges and everyone else involved, the issue is no longer whatever substantive question was originally in dispute. The issue is now the disgruntled litigants' extremism and behavior.  They are sometimes put under special orders keeping them from filing anything unless and until a single, permanently-designated judge has reviewed it and allowed it.

These litigants too often put their "last stands" on principle ahead of their actual parenting of their children. They are unwilling to bow and bend to a system they see as illegitimate and corrupt, even if they understand that that is the way to be treated better and get more time with their children.

Is the system a racket? No. Not where I work, anyway. But it doesn't have to be. It still works in a way that looks irrational to most people. It still takes people, some already cranky, and some fairly normal, perhaps even too nice, processes them, and cranks out a huge number of cranks.

When our state legislators and all those of us who help mold our culture, all the "second-hand dealers in ideas," as Hayek called us, decided decades ago to encourage widespread divorce, this was a major part of what we created. 

Americans are not brought up and educated in how a family court system works. In the courts which we learn about on TV and in civics class, a jury of 12 average local people makes the big decisions, and the judge is just a referee. And those decisions are about who did something wrong and who gets punished.

Parents who have chosen divorce or unwed parenthood, or had it thrust upon them, have no idea that instead of that system, they are going into a system where regardless of fault or faultlessness, a judge will tell them in great detail how to live and move and raise their children, now and forever until they all are grown. Nor that instead of one big trial to establish guilt or innocence and resolve everything, they may be back in court every few weeks, months or years, for enforcement, monitoring, and revision of those orders.

In that way, the family law courts work like the ecclesiastical and chancery courts that used to handle family issues, the ones that Dickens savaged in novels like Bleak House. And for good reasons, because a family is not like a business contract or a car accident.

But they also feature the most delaying, expensive, and inflammatory features of the American legal system, because this is America -- you always have the right to your day in court, to litigate about everything, to insist on strict compliance with the rules of evidence -- even when dealing with areas of life where people don't generally keep the relevant evidence, or where no witnesses are there when the really important stuff happens, or where evidence and testimony are easily faked. You can always appeal, and appeal. You have to go through all the expensive, exhausting procedures that were designed for big business litigation. Your lawyers have the ethical duty to do what you say you want, after doing their ethical duty to advise you about a bewildering array of awful things that you could do to your ex and your ex might even now be doing to you. And each of these individual things is necessary and proper, as part of the greatest legal system in the world. Even if you hate to comply with them and hate it when the other side does those things, you want the other side to comply and you want to be able to do those things to them.

That's the system we put far more families into when we tried to make divorce easier and more humane by enacting quick, unilateral, no-fault divorce, letting far more people jump straight into court without first working things out in an agreement.


Pros and cons of one-year vs. two-year separation period for contested divorce litigation -- a divorce lawyer reflects

At the end of 2017, couples began to be affected by Pennsylvania's the new divorce law, which cut the living-apart period before filing contested no-fault divorce litigation, without mutual consent and without all the financial and child-related issues worked out, from two years to one year. Carolyn R. Mirabile, a partner and family law group head at Weber Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby in Norristown, Pa., looks back at what seemed to have worked better under the old law, and what improvements she hopes for from the new law. 

One Year Later On the One-Year Separation

By Carolyn R. Mirabile in The Intelligencer - Mar 15, 2018


Utah lawmakers boost premarital education but abolish family courts, conciliation, counseling; cut divorce wait period by 2/3

Marriage and Family Courts Blog:

 

New Utah law gives marriage license discount for premarital education or counseling; marriage commission to publicize couples' options

 

Utah legislation would abolish family courts, counseling and conciliation, cut divorce wait period by 2/3


It's not a "right to custody" -- here's what the Saudi justice minister actually decreed

The headlines are misleading, but the truth behind them is strange and elusive, from a Western perspective. A "right to custody" has appeared in headlines on CNN, in Khaleej Times, and in news links circulated on social media. That wording, at least the way it would commonly be understood in the U.S., is completely wrong.

Just as divorced or separated parents in the U.S. do, Muslim Saudi women who get divorced, or whose children later reach the age for living with their fathers, have the right to ask a court to decide who gets custody, and to have the court consider the case.

What is new this month is apparently a procedural reform: IF the parents have no disputes on child-related issues, the mother can get custody by filing an application with the court, instead of going through a full-scale court case. The Justice Minister's circular says, in part:

 A mother may submit a probate application to the competent court for certifying her custody of her children, provided she signs an acknowledgement that there were no existing disputes ... 

For granting custody to a mother, the judicial panel considers her capacity for custody and then determines her application in accordance with Sharia and legal requirements, without the need for initiating a lawsuit, as is the case with all probate certifications indicated in Chapter 13 of the Law of Civil Procedure.

--  quoted in "Saudi mothers can now retain custody of children without filing lawsuits" by Habib Toumi in Gulf News

Almost all the news stories include that key phrase, "provided there are no disputes," but the headlines and lead sentences, and indeed the rest of the wording of each article, totally ignore it, as if it were a technicality or an unthinkably rare and meaningless exception. This is as bad as the reporting on no-fault divorce laws or covenant marriage laws -- blowing up changes to sound far more drastic than they are, by making crucial exceptions sound like meaningless recitations, and naively ignoring or belittling the role of agreements and disagreements between divorcing spouses.

There is no change in favor of foreign or non-Muslim women, as far as I can tell.

Other substantive changes the Minister announced:

The circular also gives the mother the right to carry out all formalities related to her children at government departments, embassies, education offices and schools, and to apply for and collect her children’s passports.
She will also be able to collect all child support and maintenance from government and civil entities, but may not travel with her children outside the Kingdom without a judge’s permission.

-- "Divorced Saudi mothers win new rights to child custody" by RUBA OBAID in Arab News

To see what this is a change from, here is what looks like the most up-to-date background on child custody in Saudi courts:

"THEMATIC REPORT ON MUSLIM FAMILY LAW AND MUSLIM WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN SAUDI ARABIA," report to CEDAW, February 2018, by Musawah: For Equality in the Family


Adultery Constitutionally Protected, Mustn't "Stigmatize", Federal 9th Circuit Rules

Perez v. City of Roseville, as described in:

Ninth Circuit: Adultery Is Constitutionally Protected

The court holds that Lawrence v. Texas limits government restrictions on extramarital sex.


2018 Va. family law legislation: Alimony, court reporter reform, abuse prevention, child support, inheritance, violence, legalized adultery?

UPDATED APRIL 10, 2018

MODIFICATION BY THE GOVERNOR 

  •  HB 1351 Joint legal or physical child custody; custody and visitation decisions, communication to parties. Governor added: In any case or proceeding involving the custody or visitation of a child, to enable the child to apply for a state or federal benefit and upon the request of any party, the court shall make any finding of fact required by state or federal law in order for the child to receive such benefit. The existing language, which the Governor did not change, is: "The court shall consider and may award joint legal, joint physical, or sole custody, and there shall be no presumption in favor of any form of custody."  The bill's original text, completely replaced as it went through both houses, was, "The consideration of "joint physical custody" means the court shall consider custody and visitation arrangements that are reasonably constructed to maximize a child's time with each parent to the greatest extent possible in the child's best interests." At least the statute still says, "The court shall assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents, when appropriate, and encourage parents to share in the responsibilities of rearing their children." 

ENACTED, SIGNED BY GOVERNOR

KILLED (incl. passed by, stricken, tabled, continued to next year ...)

  • HB 599 Child support; nonpayment, amount of arrearage paid, suspension of driver's license.
  • HB 1223 Erin's Law, having schools educate children to recognize, resist and report molestation
  • HB 661 Assault and battery against a family or household member; enhanced, penalty. [Passed house, passed senate with substitute,  each house insisted on its own version, time ran out for Conference Committee]
  • HB 411 Assisted conception; gender-neutral as to same-sex.
  • HB 998 Parental or legal custodial powers, temporary delegation of; child-placing agency. [Passed House, continued to 2019 in Senate committee]
  • HB 807 Custody and visitation agreements; best interests of the child, violent abuse of other family members
  • HB 412 Marriage-related criminal laws; gender-neutral terms, adultery repeal, penalty.
  • HB 413 Adoption; gender-neutral as to same-sex.
  • HB 414 Same-sex marriage; marriage laws, gender-neutral terms.
  • HB 478 Domestic violence-related misdemeanors; enhanced, penalty.
  • HB 1237 Assault and battery against a family or household member; first offense, enhanced penalty.
  • HB 149 Child support order payee; change in physical custody of child, orders involving DSS.
  • HB 1331 Child support; review of guidelines federal compliance.
  • SB 64 Custody and visitation decisions; communication to parties required in writing.
  • SB 70 Custody and visitation; rights of parents with a disability.
  • SB 178 Parental or legal custodial powers, temporary delegation of; child-placing agency.
  • SB 596 Victims of domestic violence, etc.; firearms safety or training course.
  • SB 603 Same-sex marriage; gender-neutral terms.
  • SB 612 Assisted conception; parentage presumption.
  • SB 727 FOIA; exemptions for courts of record, courts not of records and Office of the Executive Secretary
  • SB 938 Child support; withholding of income, contracts with an independent contractor.
  • HB 216 Guardians, licensed physician, etc.; annual reports to include medical examination.
  • HB 383 Missing-heir search firms; void contracts.
  • HB 406 Guardianship; protects communication between incapacitated persons & others, notification of relatives.
  • HB 406 Guardianship; communication between incapacitated persons & others, notification of relatives.
  • HB 1403 Electronic wills; requirements.
  • HB 1565 Presumption of death; missing person reports.

 Compiled by John Crouch, updated by John Crouch and Sarah Araman


My comments on proposed limited-scope representation rules; your comments due March 1

The Virginia Supreme Court and the Judicial Council are considering a new rule to deal with limited-scope representation, especially assistance to people who are already in litigation. My comments on it are below. The proposal, and where you can send comments by March 1, 2018, are at:

Advisory Committee on Rules of Court, Judicial Council of Virginia, "LIMITED-SCOPE REPRESENTATION ISSUES".

Overall comments — 
 
This is a very important reform. Full-scale representation in family law litigation is often unaffordable even by people who would be considered upper middle class. And it takes both divorcing spouses to prevent any particular divorce from becoming unaffordable, long-running litigation.
 
The proposed rule has many extra cautionary requirements for the attorney, or the attorney’s name and contact information, to be present in court, and on documents, even for issues where the lawyer is not involved. Please bear in mind that each of these requirements comes at a cost, not only of the attorney’s time, attention, and availability for other cases, but also by sowing predictable confusion among clients and especially their opposing parties, who aren’t involved in the limited-scope agreement. When lawyers’ names are on papers or a lawyer is present, lay people are going to assume that the lawyer is a prime mover in whatever is going on. Lay people, and even the lawyers themselves, will often feel that the lawyer has some responsibility to intervene or advise about whatever comes to the lawyer’s attention. Lawyers' instinct to be helpful will inevitably cause “mission creep” in many cases. So all such requirements should be kept to the minimum necessary.
 
As lawyers comply with these additional requirements, clients and other members of the public may feel that the lawyer is hanging around like a vulture waiting to insert herself into the proceedings and expand her involvement so that it is no longer limited. Or interfering, intruding and violating the client’s desire to limit the scope of the lawyer’s work, by writing to the client with repeated notifications of well-known facts about hearing dates, etc., whenever the lawyer is cced on something the other side sends out. Many clients already respond this way to communications that court rules and ethics rules require us to send.
 
Line comments
 
9-10 
 
 I agree that a lawyer should not be present but generally uninvolved, only popping up now and then with objections. That would be chaotic and unfair.
 
But I can also see the value in having an attorney handle only a particular motion in limine or motion to suppress. It seems fairly clear that the intent is to allow that, but it would help to make that explicit.
 
11-13
 
" A notice of limited scope representation is not required for  … (ii) services performed by an attorney before any litigation is pending”
 
Does that dispensation also apply to the requirements to “indicate” or “identify" in (1) (F), Alternative versions 2 through 5?
 
I believe it should apply. Either way, that question should be answered explicitly.
 
26 et seq. — Alternative versions of (F)
 
In all versions, the term “papers for submission to a court” is intended to be clear, but what about marital separation agreements? They are not court filings. They are binding contracts when the parties sign them, regardless of whether they are submitted to a court. But whenever one gets signed by both spouses, perhaps 95% of the time there is going to be divorce, and the agreement i8s going to be submitted to the court as part of the divorce process.
 
I think limited-scope assistance is crucial, so I oppose Alternative # 5, which essentially bans limited-scope, and Alternative # 4, which creates a presumption against it; imposes a needless requirement to essentially file a notice of appearance, and then to file a notice of disappearance.
 
86
 
“Papers” sounds vague. I think you mean litigation documents such as pleadings or discovery requests, but we need a more precise, comprehensive, understandable, and distinctive term for that.
If it’s intended to mean everything, including settlement correspondence, that’s reasonable, too, but that too would need to be clearer. Because the word “papers”, to a lot of people, vaguely indicates papers that are somehow official, binding, and/or threatening.
 
88
 
The requirement should be to notify the “sender”, not “the adversaries”. They might not be the same people.
 
 
notify the adversaries in writing of that fact
should be changed to  
notify the adversaries, in writing, of that fact
or
notify the adversaries of that in writing
 
But really, “that” or “that fact” might not make clear to everyone which of the facts mentioned earlier in the sentence it refers to, so it would be better to say, 
 
“the attorney must notify the sender that the documents received deal wholly or partly with matters outside the scope of the limited representation,"
 
107-108
 
"(D) Contacts by adversaries or co-parties on matters within the limited scope of 108 representation shall be with counsel …"
 
What about family law cases, where many couples legitimately continue some kinds of negotiation between themselves, even when they both have counsel who are negotiating at the same time? 
 
110-111
 
“copy served upon the attorney making a limited scope appearance” — 
 
Would serving the attorney require that attorney to respond and notify as required in (3)(C)? If that happens once, it makes sense or is at least harmless. But in litigation where filings go back and forth almost every week, it’s going to drag the limited-scope attorney into a lot of busy work, and confuse litigants — the client and/or the opposing party — about the attorney’s role.
 
115-116
 
(A) — attendance at all court proceedings, outside the scope,  should not be required if the rule is truly allowing limited representation. I would expect attorneys to charge for this time, and it would be a major burden on the clients and the attorneys.
 
John Crouch
VSB Council Member for 17th Circuit
Fellow, International Academy of Family Lawyers (Formerly IAML)
and International Academy of Collaborative Professionals
 

Alabama senate votes to abolish marriage licensing, celebration requirement, but NOT to separate marriage and state

Alabama's Senate has once again passed this bill, now numbered SB 13. It does not separate marriage from government, but couples will now simply register their marriages with the courts, instead of asking the courts to license them and having to have them formally celebrated and then recorded with the court. Having the marriage celebrated will be optional and the government will not be involved with that. But the state would still keep track of who is married, to the limited extent that it already does. Marriage would still have many legal consequences, including laws on bigamy, divorce and taxes.

UPDATE: It was approved Jan. 25 by a House Committee with an amendment that does not change what it does. Track its progress here.

Similar bills passed the Senate in 2016 and 2017, and one passed Oklahoma's House in 2015.

Currently, all U.S. states require marriage licenses. There is some disastrous misinformation out there saying that not all do, but that is based on some states recognizing common-law marriage, which is very different and can take years to establish; it is no sure substitute for licensing when you want to get married.

 


Federal "diversity jurisdiction" exists to prevent unfair home-court advantage, so why doesn't it apply to family law?

"Family Law Is Not 'Civil': The Faulty Foundation of

The Domestic Relations Exception To Federal Jurisdiction”

By Joseph A. Carrol, Dickinson School of Law

ABA First Place Schwab Essay Contest Winner, 2017

 


Father lost visitation for trying to stop psychotic torture of child in #Munchausen by proxy case. Which part of that story is the most shocking?

You may have read about Christopher, a Dallas-area 8-year-old who has been, without exaggeration, sadistically tortured his whole life, completely robbed of a normal life, in an extreme case of "Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy." A dashing and lighthearted name for a horrible, sadistic form of lifelong child abuse; they really should give it a name as serious and awful as it is. It has many vague and forgettable official names, none of which are remotely as ghastly as they ought to be.

Christopher’s mother treated him as if he was deathly ill from his birth until she was arrested last week: feeding tubes, oxygen tubes, heart tubes, hospice, do-not-resuscitate orders, wheelchairs, 13 surgeries, hundreds of hospital visits. She tried to subject him to a lung transplant. But actually, he was always completely healthy, except for life-threatening blood infections from the tubes. 

But what's really more shocking: that there are a few psychotic child-torturers out there, or that the family courts and the medical system protect and enable them, even when the children's fathers discover the truth and try to rescue them?

When Christoper was three, his father went to family court to make her stop, and instead, he lost all visitation. He says the judge refused to look at evidence and condemned him for his refusal to accept that Christopher was dying. Here's what the local paper says now about his court battles:

For years, Crawford said he tried to convince Dallas County family court judges that his son was not sick but they believed Bowen, who would eventually claim that their son was dying, initially from a rare genetic disorder and later from cancer.

Crawford said a Dallas County judge even blocked him in late 2012 from visiting his son, who was then 3.

“It was always the same story: Christopher is dying. The father doesn’t need to be around because he doesn’t know to take care of him,” a tearful Bowen would tell the judges, according to Crawford. “... Every time I went to court, they made me feel like I was the worst human ever.”

The 34-year-old woman is in Dallas County Jail in lieu of $150,000 bond. Her court-appointed attorney did not return a message seeking comment Friday but Bowen denied the allegations last month to CPS investigators.

Crawford said he is grateful that Bowen stands accused of wrongdoing, but remains frustrated that it took so long.

“It’s horrible for my son, or any kid because obviously my son is not the only one that has had to go through this type of torture,” Crawford said. “The system has to be exposed — all the weaknesses that are in the system — because the kids don’t deserve that.”

The allegations against Bowen fit the model for what is known as Munchausen syndrome by proxy, a disorder in which a person exaggerates or creates medical symptoms to gain attention.

Convincing family court judges that a mother may be medically abusing her child is often a challenge, experts say.

Even in 2017, such medical child abuse is still relatively unknown when compared to other types of maltreatment and “so many court judges are inexperienced in this realm,” said Dr. Marc Feldman, an Alabama psychiatrist who is a national expert and author on Munchausen syndrome by proxy.

“I encounter tone-deaf family court judges a lot,” Feldman said. “They, like most members of the public, can’t let themselves believe that an apparently-loving mother could engage in medical child abuse.

“They are used to seeing gross evidence of physical or sexual abuse — bleeding, bruising, broken bones — and don’t seem to respond to the more subtle indications of medical child abuse.”

Feldman said such judges also tend to treat doctors as “gods who are incapable of error, not realizing that these abusive mothers doctor-shop until they find someone who will acquiesce to their demands.”

Crawford said he recognizes he made mistakes during his fight in the family courts.

Several times, he represented himself — something he now regrets. He said while Bowen seemed to draw on the judge’s sympathy with her claims and tears, he only angered them with his insistence that Bowen was lying.

“I’m not a criminal. I’ve never been before a judge for anything. Of course, I’d seen “Judge Judy” but I thought Judge Judy was fake,” Crawford said. “To see real life Judge Judys, that was something new to me. I’m like, they’re allowed to talk to me like this?”

Though he had court-ordered visitation initially, Crawford said Bowen would frequently cancel at the last minute, claiming Christopher was too sick. She’d tell judges that Crawford didn’t know how to properly care for their seriously ill son, further delaying his visits until he could take court-ordered classes in things like CPR and G-tube care.

Until recently, Crawford’s last visit with his son had been Dec. 7, 2012, when he took the boy’s great-grandmother to Kaylene’s Dallas apartment to see Christopher.

“We went to court two weeks later and Kaylene told the judge that Christopher went into cardiac arrest due to my visit,” Crawford said.

He says at a subsequent hearing, [the judge] said she was taking away Crawford’s visitations with his son since he refused to believe the boy was dying.

“She asked Kaylene, ‘Would you mind if his father sees him one more time before he passes away?’ but Kaylene said no,” Crawford said. ...

In January 2014, he hired a new attorney and filed for custody of Christopher.

When they went before [the judge], Bowen cried and claimed Christopher, then 4, was in a coma.

“ [The judge] immediately stated she’d heard this case and she can’t believe we would drag Kaylene back to court when the child is dying,” Crawford recalled. “She wouldn’t hear the new evidence that included doctor reports that Christopher was not ill.”

... More than three years later and even after Bowen’s arrest, Crawford is still fighting — this time trying to get Christopher out of foster care and home with him.

He said CPS has expressed reservations about moving the boy out of foster care because Christopher doesn’t know his father very well. Never mind, Crawford points out, that Christopher doesn’t know his foster family well either.

“That’s taxpayer money. Why spend all that extra money when he has a father that has been there from day one, that’s been fighting for this?” Crawford said.

Christopher had 323 doctor visits and 13 major surgeries. Here’s why his mom was arrested


Where Congress's attack on alimony tax exclusion came from: Both sides' explanations insufficient, not reality-based. Here's what we know:

The House-passed GOP tax bill shifts the tax burden on alimony from alimony payors to recipients. I.e., about 97% of the time, from divorced women to divorced men, who we all assume are in higher tax brackets than their exes. Currently, alimony is considered part of the recipient's taxable income, and not the payor's. The change would affect alimomy from post-2017 court orders or agreements, including modifications of earlier orders.(There's one feature of the bill that's completely good, and apparently not controversial: Including alimony payments pursuant to a written marital agreement, with no court order, in the definition of alimony.)

 It's important to sometimes pause from a search for subtle "incentives" and subliminal effects, and remind ourselves what the most basic and obvious effect of a policy change is: In this case, taxing men instead of women on tens of thousands, sometimes over $100,000, of annual income. Alimony is all or most of many divorced women's incomes, and can already take a very large fraction of some men's incomes. Virginia's guidelines call for at least 28% of a breadwinner's gross income as alimony to a non-working spouse, and that's before child support, and before any deductions from his paycheck for taxes, social security, etc. 

Lawyers, journalists and even the National Organization for Women have attacked the proposal, not for being anti-male, but for changing the law's current incentive for men to agree to pay alimony, and thus reducing the amount of alimony women would get. The change probably would have that effect, but that whole argument probably only occurred to them because this is a Republican proposal and it fits the narrative of a GOP "War on Women". Ordinarily, women's groups would be all for something that shifts divorce women's tax burdens wholesale onto their exes.

Blogger Stuart Levine, and many columnists quoting him, including Kevin Drum at the usually more thorough Mother Jones, have really only speculated about why anyone would want to do such a thing. Liberal writers and the supposably* conservative proponents of the change seem to share the mutually convenient illusion that this is an attack on divorce, on behalf of Christian morality. But that simply has nothing to do with how divorce, alimony or taxes actually work. The GOP Ways & Means Committee Summary says only this on behalf of the change:

  • The provision would eliminate what is effectively a “divorce subsidy” under current law, in that a divorced couple can often achieve a better tax result for payments between them than a married couple can.
  • ... spousal support as a consequence of a divorce or separation should have the same tax treatment as the provision of spousal support within the context of a married couple, as well as the provision of child support.
  • ... the provision would increase revenues by $8.3 billion over 2018-27.

Frankly, living as close to Republican Washington as I do, it sounds like a young staffer who doesn't know anyone who pays alimony, who hasn't been invovled in a divorce, and just recently got off the parental  tax returns and started filing form 1040-EZ, was thrown mysterious, possibly garbled instructions for changing something about alimony taxation, and was given 15 minutes to come up with some Republican-sounding arguments for it. But actually, the proposal was part of an early-2014 "Tax Reform Act" introduced by former Ways & Means chair Rep. Dave Camp, now retired,  and the arguments above are repeated verbatim from the Committee Summary of that bill. 

The "subsidy" argument, to the extent that it's either launched or received as an attempt to discourage divorce, partakes of the long-standing and totally wrongheaded assumption that "a couple" decides to get divorced, and may be incentivized, rewarded or punished for doing so. This dates back to the early days of no-fault divorce reform, when reformers picked the most compelling poster-children, decent people who both wanted to divorce but who were caged in "Holy Deadlock" by laws that denied them a divorce even when they both wanted one. Some conservatives and moralists, being apparently unfamiliar with divorce, and gullible about letting their opponents pick the battlefield and define its terms, compliantly responded that these couples were hastily giving up on their marriage and should be incentivized, restricted, counseled, and/or made to wait to see if it's what "they" really wanted. And whenever any change to loosen or tighten divorce laws is proposed, the same old arguments are dusted off, even though divorce decisions have long been unilateral and the proposed changes hardly ever would affect the "poster children" whom the arguments describe. 

Individuals decide to divorce, pay taxes after divorce, and might or might not respond to incentives. Couples don't and can't.

The Committee's equality-based argument is even more surreal. Spousal support after separation or divorce is very different from what the Committee refers to as "spousal support within the context of a married couple", which it says should receive the same tax treatment. Uh, a married couple that isn't separated lives together as a family and an economic unit, and doesn't pay support checks to each other. And they can't get "the same tax treatment", because a married couple files taxes jointly or as the very disadvantageous "married filing separately", while divorced people file as single, or jointly with their new spouses. Again, this sounds like college debaters grasping for arguments about parts of adult life that they know nor care nothing about. 

 Here's what might have led to this: Veteran Congressman Lloyd Doggett D-TX last year was pushing a plan to require 1099s for alimony payments, citing a Treasury study showing about $2.3 billion a year in alimony excluded from payors' income but never reported by recipients. He wanted to use the revenue it gleaned to help states improve their foster care systems."He has been discussing the issue with Ways and Means Chairman Kevin Brady," Congressional Quarterly Roll Call reported. Perhaps the drafters set out to do what Doggett proposed, then realized that it would be simpler, cheaper, and revenue-positive to eliminate the tax code's recognition of alimony entirely, and seized on the 2014 proposal and arguments. It's probably the pet project of one Ways & Means member or staffer who's been there since Camp was Chair.

But where are the deeper, more extensive arguments that ordinarily would lead to something like this? To find out I traced backwards from the only article I found in favor of the change, "A Human Capital Theory of Alimony and Tax", by feminist law professor  Tessa Davis in the  George Mason Law Review. The only part of it I've thoroughly read is its abstract, every word of which is totally wrong, except for the stuff about "Family Law Theory", the entire posited existence of which is not only wrong, but should not be conceiveable in a rational world where people care about the real-life effects of anything. Even to utter its name, silently to oneself,  throws down a gauntlet and crosses a Rubicon into a world where mere Families and Laws will henceforth be trivial playthings in the tiny hands of academic Theories and their adepts and familiars.

And yet I cannot help but admire Davis for having the monumental audacity to claim to speak for "a scholarly consensus" in favor of some kind of fundamental change. She cites only two previous proposals for tax law to disregard alimony: Rep. Camp's 2014 bill, and Donald H. Berman, "The Alimony Deduction: Time to Slaughter the Sacred Cow," 4 Am. J. of Tax Pol’y 49 (1985). Berman called the exclusion "inequitable, complex and arbitrary", and above all, unnecessary now that marginal tax rates had declined from a healthy, vigorous 91% to a negligible 50%. More of the history of dissent from the current regime can be learned from another, very solid, article Davis cites, Deborah Geier, "Simplifying and Rationalizing the Federal Income Tax Law Applicable to Transfers in Divorce," 55 TAX LAWYER 363 (2001).  It recounts that in the mid-1980s, Senate Finance Committee staffers proposed totally eliminating the alimony exclusion. They tried to rally women's groups to their side. The ultimate results they got, and possibly what they were aiming for all along, were incremental restrictions that may have helped increase revenue and predictability.  (Id., pp. 404-406.)  The article advocates letting couples choose who'll pay the taxes on any forms of support or property transfers, with a default rule that the recipient has to pay them. It cites a very similar proposal, Laurie L. Malman, "Unfinished Reform: The Tax Consequences of Divorce," 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 367 (1986).

 Davis's own argument is that alimony in a divorce is mostly viewed as compensation for "human capital," or return on investment or compensation for loss, none of which are taxed, and that any distinction between it and property transfers is artificial. (See pp. 50-55 of her article, downloadable from the abstract web page.) (Malman made similar arguments for her free-choice proposal.)

But the problem is, normal alimony, the kind that qualifies for the tax exclusion, almost always comes directly from someone's income -- where, unlike property, it get taxed if the Code doesn't exclude it -- and goes to provide income for someone else. The IRS has established clear, easily-followed boundaries between regular alimony and non-qualifying lump-sums that are more like property division. And in real alimony negotiations and trials, alimony is almost totally based on income -- needs and ability to pay. Yes, decisions are sometimes influenced by arguments about spouses' contributions to the marriage, but when statutes,  judges and litigants look at women having sacrificed their own careers for the sake of a husband's career or to raise children, their point is that the women have a legitimate reason for needing supplemental income, and that it may take time for them to wholly or partly "rehabilitate" their earning potential.

Once again, this time on the left, the theorists are looking at the subtler reasons for alimony and missing what it obviously IS and what it's almost always FOR in real life.

 

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* "Supposably" is a real word. It's from Seinfeld.