Virginia Family Law Appeals

Rahnema v. Rahnema: ANNULMENT AND DIVORCE — ANNULMENT FILING LATE IN ED TRIAL — BIGAMY CLAIM — EVIDENCE — JUDGE’S IGNORING EVIDENCE NOT TIMELY OBJECTED TO — EVIDENCE TRANSLATED FROM FOREIGN LANGUAGES — ABSENCE OF WITNESSES — BIGAMY STANDAR

A Virginia Beach judge probably got more than he bargained for when he gamely plunged into the divorce of a couple of Iranians.  Among the many seldom-seen issues it brought up were what to do when one spouse files a bigamy charge just before the final equitable distribution hearing (O.K. to reject it), and how much a judge is obligated to let grossly questionable evidence in just because the other party doesn’t properly object to it. 

Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins: INTERSTATE CUSTODY JURISDICTION – PKPA – HOMOSEXUAL CIVIL UNIONS.

The much-publicized dispute between two lesbians joined in a Vermont civil union, over the child one of them bore by artificial insemination, was decided by the Virginia Court of Appeals in an opinion that is economical, straightforward, focused and direct, which concentrates on the PKPA issue.  In Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 49 Va. App. 87, 637 SE2d 330,  21 VLW 746 (11/28/06), the appellate court reversed the trial court determination that one woman was the sole parent because that Virginia trial court lacked child custody jurisdiction under the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738A, and was required to accord full faith and credit to the Vermont custody decision giving one woman custody and the other visitation. 

DESERTION – AFTER SEPARATION AGREEMENT – INHERITANCE LAW – AUGMENTED ESTATE – DISQUALIFICATION AS A DESERTER.

When it comes to the intersection of divorce law and inheritance law in Virginia, you can learn some things you never knew, and probably never even suspected, from a recent remarkable Supreme Court opinion in Purce v. Patterson,  654 S.E.2d 885 (1/11/08).  It was a hard case.  It did not involve a widow, but it certainly involved a widower, and he did not come off very well.  This was one of those Statement of Fact cases, and according to the judge’s Statement of Fact, this Westmoreland County husband had been a thorough rotter, making nothing but negative contributions to the marriage.  In a unanimous seven-judge opinion by Senior Justice Lacy, the Supreme Court went into the nature of desertion and abandonment in divorce law and in inheritance law, analyzed each, and found them to be markedly different.  This served to justify upholding the trial judge’s decision to disqualify this widowed husband from having his statutory share of his late wife’s estate under §64.1-16.3(A) on grounds that he abandoned her.