When the Chesterfield trial judge in Lewis v. Lewis, 53 Va. App. 528, 673 S.E.2d 888, (3/24/09), felt the husband had subjected the wife to an outrageous injustice when he retired early and thus “deprived wife of her option, specifically granted to her under the terms of the PSA, to receive her portion of the ... pension over the course of her lifetime,” it afforded wife the remedy she sought: ordering the husband to obtain $200,000 of life insurance with her as beneficiary. Husband of course protested that there is no statutory authority for this, and the Court of Appeals agreed that the rule of Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 579; 311 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1984), still stands. It thus stated “We conclude that, although the trial court did not err in determining that wife was entitled to some remedy … the trial court did not have authority to order that husband obtain life insurance … .” So a few things we have always assumed remain true – at least for now. And if that wasn’t plain enough, The Court of Appeals explained that “under Code §20-107.3(G)(2), a trial court cannot order that a person obtain life insurance on himself for the benefit of the former spouse, although a court can order that a person elect to have survivor’s benefits on their [sic] pension or annuity.” After unsuccessfully citing cases from other states, wife argued that the delayed-QDRO provision of the statute, §20-107.3(K), in authorizing “additional orders” to effectuate parties’ agreements, allowed the insurance-provision order. However, the Court did not believe that the general authorization of subsection (K) could control or override the “specific provision in subsection (G) ….” Thus, entitled as this wife may be to some remedy, “the trial court crafted the wrong remedy here.” In a footnote, the appellate court hastens to assure the trial judge that it is by no means foreclosing the invention of some kind of remedy, so long as it is a proper one.