When the General Assembly in 2012 passed Code §20-106 A allowing divorce by
affidavits in some no-fault cases, it probably did not foresee all the odd cases that
could arise seeking to fit the facts within this statute’s narrow gates, but
the Court of Appeals had little trouble affirming a dismissal of the wife’s
complaint in a case turning on whether or
means and, or and means or. So if a
statute allows you to proceed “where … The adverse party has been personally
served with the complaint and has failed to file a responsive pleading or to
make an appearance,” does it mean that you need one or both? In other words,
does that mean the personally served adverse party need only have done one, or
that he must have done both those things? (Well, that is the sort of thing
people pay lawyers to do, after all.) In Cruz
v. Cruz, 62 Va. App. 31, 741 S.E.2d 71 (4/30/13), the Court of Appeals said it’s obvious that it just means
doing one, and you don’t have to have done both. The Wife here could not rely
on Code §20-106 A, because the husband, living in Saudi Arabia when served, entered
an appearance. In fact, it was a special appearance moving to dismiss on grounds
of bigamy. So this wife relied on the wrong statute, because now she didn’t
even pass the threshold requirement of having only a no-fault case, and she
couldn’t rely on the deposition-divorce statute because the other party had
appeared. For those who don’t know, these new-fangled divorces are allowed only
for those who have a full year of uninterrupted separation (or six months with
a complete separation agreement and no minor children). To read the new statute
as though it requires both a responsive pleading and an appearance would be
contrary to the plain language of the statute and to the intent thereof, the
Court says.