Could a
circuit court terminate a mother’s parental rights by incorporating a
separation agreement in which she had agreed to that? Of course not. The Court
of Appeals, which is perhaps more analytical than you or me, explains it two
ways, really, and then ties them up together neatly. First, the trial court had
no jurisdiction to do that. When parental rights are terminated, it happens
only one way, which is under the applicable statute, §16.1-283, and its procedural and substantive
requirements have to be met. None of that was done, so that jurisdiction was
not present. Also, an agreement to that is void as against public policy, and
unenforceable, so the agreement couldn’t provide a jurisdictional foundation
for anything. The mother had sued for visitation, but get this: because her
parental rights had been terminated, she didn’t have any legitimate interest in
visitation, and thus had no standing, according to the trial court. But the
circuit court couldn’t rely on the unlawful termination to make that
no-legitimate-interest finding. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with
directions in this case, Layne v. Layne,
61 Va. App. 32, 733 SE2d 139 (10/23/12), inter alia, to reinstate her
visitation claim.