In Kellogg v. Green, Va. S.Ct. 2/22/18, an amended prenup was incorporated, but not merged, into a divorce decree. The ex-wife reopened the divorce case and sought a Rule to Show Cause, claiming the ex-husband owed her money under the agreement. The court declined to issue a rule, saying the agreement did not say "when, where or in what form payment of any amount due shall be performed." Wife then sued for breach of contract on the same grounds. Husband pled res judicata, and the trial court agreed. Wife protested that the rejection of the Rule to Show Cause was not a final order, as the court had kept the case on the active docket for further enforcement of the agreements.
The Supreme Court looks at Rule 1:6 on res judicata, emphasizing that it requires a final judgment, and that that judgment must be "on the merits":
A party whose claim for relief arising from identified conduct, a transaction, or an occurrence, is decided on the merits by a final judgment, shall be forever barred from prosecuting any second or subsequent civil action against the same opposing party or parties on any claim or cause of action that arises from that same conduct, transaction or occurrence, whether or not the legal theory or rights asserted in the second or subsequent action were raised in the prior lawsuit, and regardless of the legal elements or the evidence upon which any claims in the prior proceeding depended, or the particular remedies sought.
The Supreme Court doubts that this judgment was "on the merits", but wife only raised the finality issue, so that is all that the Court decides. Even if a trial court disposes of the main issues and only retains jurisdiction to address other issues, its orders are not final nor appealable, the Supreme Court says:
A final judgment is essential to the imposition of res judicata to bar a claim. Norris v. Mitchell, 255 Va. 235, 239, 495 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1998). A decree that enters judgment for a party is not final if it “expressly provides that the court retains jurisdiction to reconsider the judgment or to address other matters still pending in the action before it.” Super Fresh Food Mkts. v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555, 561, 561 S.E.2d 734, 737 (2002); see also Johnson v. Woodard, 6 281 Va. 403, 409-10, 707 S.E.2d 325, 328 (2011) (“[A] circuit court may avoid the application of the 21-day time period in Rule 1:1 by including specific language stating that the court is retaining jurisdiction to address matters still pending before the court.”). A decree is final only when it disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief that is contemplated and leaves nothing to be done by the court in the cause except its ministerial execution. Where further action of the court in the cause is necessary to give completely the relief contemplated by the court, the decree is not final but interlocutory. Brooks v. Roanoke Cty. Sanitation Auth., 201 Va. 934, 936, 114 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1960) (citations omitted).
In this case, the Supreme Court says, the trial court decided that a Rule to Show Cause was not the proper way to enforce the particular provision of the agreement, and kept the case open for enforcement of the agreement by other means:
The Show Cause Order did not contain any language to indicate that it was a final order regarding the enforceability of the Agreements; there was no language indicating that there was nothing further to be done in the action. There was no language in the Show Cause Order which would bar the filing of a subsequent show cause petition or the attempted enforcement of the Agreements in some other manner. Thus, the Show Cause Order did not render a final judgment concerning the enforceability of the Agreements.
But that could have easily gone the other way, on the finality issue. If the trial court had written that the denial of the Rule to Show Cause petition was final because a contract action would be in a separate suit, and had not kept the case open for anything else, that would been a final order. That would have led to an unfair result, because a contract obligation that does not include enough specifics to be enforceable as contempt of court can still be an obligation which a court could interpret and enforce. Especially with the court's powers under 20-107.3(K). This particular obligation was to pay the wife $5,000 for every year of marriage.
At the end of the opinion, the Supreme Court once again reminds us that its holding in Lee v. Spoden, 290 Va. 235, 776 S.E.2d 798 (2015), in which a contempt proceeding created res judicata, requires a judgment that was not only final, but was on the merits.